The UN Knew in 2008 that the LTTE Was Going to Use Civilians as Human Shields

21 November 2012, 3:54 pm

By Kath Noble

Last week I felt like I had been transported back in time. We were back in those awful first six months of 2009, when I was by turns horrified at the plight of the people caught up in the fighting in the Vanni and disgusted with the way in which the international community was responding.

Of course, we all wanted to stop the war. I hate violence. But as I argued then and continue to believe, at that point, the only way the war was going to stop was with the defeat of the LTTE. Prabhakaran would not give up on Eelam. He was going to continue his vicious campaign against the Sri Lankan state and all its communities until he was caught or killed. Our task, therefore, was to minimise the damage. We had to try to ensure that it was done with as little death and destruction as possible.

The UN has inadvertently confirmed this hypothesis. In the report of the Internal Review Panel into its actions in Sri Lanka in the final stages of the war, which was released by Ban Ki-Moon last week, it says that it had realised by the end of January that the LTTE was going to lose. And it did the right thing. It worked out a plan for a surrender.

This could have saved a lot of lives.

Some people are very keen to find out how many. The UN count, according to the quite reasonable criteria that they employed in what were very difficult circumstances, is 7,737. I think that even a tiny fraction of that number would have been too many.

The surrender plan was put to the LTTE at the beginning of February, but it was rejected. The LTTE had lost both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu by then, but Prabhakaran would not relent. He rejected it again in April, even after having lost most of his senior commanders at the Battle of Anandapuram. He was trapped inside the No Fire Zone, but still he would not accept the inevitable.

Some people no doubt consider that heroic. But it was the biggest crime in the history of the conflict.

Prabhakaran wanted a massacre.

His strategy was to create a humanitarian disaster so extraordinary that the international community would feel compelled to intervene. He must have known long before it dawned on the UN that he would not be able to hold out against the Sri Lankan forces. He was no idiot when it came to war.

He wasn’t so stupid when it came to international politics either.

I said at the time that the international community was not going to get involved in Sri Lanka. But many people thought otherwise.

The West had by then established a pattern of ‘humanitarian wars’. It had dropped enough bombs on Serbia in 1999 to make Slobodan Milosevic withdraw from Kosovo. Then in 2001 it had set about trying to wipe out the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in 2003 it had invaded Iraq and finished off Saddam Hussein. The attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan were part of the post-9/11 War on Terror, but they were sold to the Western public as struggles against governments that not only posed a danger to the rest of the world but also suppressed their own people. Those wars were still going on when Prabhakaran was holed up in the No Fire Zone, but they had already achieved regime change. And Kosovo was his dream come true. In 2008, it was declared an independent nation.

Western politicians had other motives for intervening, but they always talked about fighting to save the world from a repeat of Rwanda. Prabhakaran thought that Western forces might be persuaded to come to Sri Lanka too.

For this, somebody somewhere certainly deserves blame.

The UN contributed to the misconception, but the really guilty parties are, of course, those in the West who started these ‘humanitarian wars’.

It would be comforting to believe that we can always prevent killings if only we try hard enough. Nobody likes to feel powerless. However, in Iraq, Afghanistan and even Kosovo, ‘humanitarian wars’ killed more people than they saved. If Western forces had set foot in Sri Lanka, the result would have been exactly the same.

That is why when I said that the West would not intervene in Sri Lanka, I said it with relief. Rwanda was a very special case.

If the West had not abused the memory of Rwanda so often, Prabhakaran might have chosen a different tactic. He might have abandoned the idea of holding onto territory. Instead of retreating into ever smaller areas of land, dragging with him at gunpoint those 300,000 plus civilians, conscripting more and more of them with every passing day and sending them to the frontlines to die, while compelling the rest to cower in bunkers with too little to eat and limited medical supplies as his cadres fired from among them at the Sri Lankan forces, bringing down on their heads such a devastating rain of bullets and bombs, he might have gone back to the jungles and waged a guerrilla war. (Of course, he might still have done exactly the same thing, on the basis that there’s nothing like a massacre to mobilise future generations. He clearly didn’t care as much about human life as the rest of us do.)

The Internal Review Panel report criticises the UN’s Resident Coordinator in Sri Lanka for his lack of political understanding in dealing with the Sri Lankan state, but it fails to recognise that it still hasn’t answered the question of how to deal with Prabhakaran.Yet this was the million dollar question!

The UN knew that the LTTE was going to use civilians as a human shield in 2008. The report admits that the LTTE repeatedly tried to use the UN’s presence in Kilinochchi as protection for its activities, positioning its facilities next to UN offices despite agreements to the contrary. It also acknowledges that the UN had to leave behind its 17 national staff when it officially withdrew from the Vanni in September because the LTTE was holding their 86 dependants hostage. In 2008, the UN knew what an impossible situation the Sri Lankan forces were facing.

What could it have done better, then, in 2009?

How about persuading David Miliband and all the other Western politicians who stuck their noses into Sri Lanka that the responsible course of action was to tell Prabhakaran that he had no option but to surrender?

No, that isn’t even mentioned as a possibility.

The ‘master plan’ that the UN’s experts have come up with after six months of work makes exactly the same mistakes the international community did at the time. It ignores the LTTE.

Instead of making it clear to Prabhakaran that he was on his own, which at least might have encouraged him to think again, the Internal Review Panel report proposes that the UN should have increased its pressure on the Sri Lankan forces.

It argues that the UN should have publicised the casualty figures that it was gathering via sms and highlighted its belief that most of the deaths were occurring in shelling by the Sri Lankan forces. It says that the UN should have been more forceful in warning the Sri Lankan state against committing war crimes. This would have saved lives, the report claims. But how? No doubt people like Gordon Weiss would have felt better if they had done so. But what would it actually have changed? At the beginning of February, the UN was sure that about 1,000 civilians had been killed in a period of three weeks. This had increased by a little more than 1,500 in another four weeks to the beginning of March.

By this stage, as we surely all remember, there was already tremendous pressure on the Sri Lankan forces. The LTTE’s propaganda machine had its genocide bumper stickers out, and it was stage managing protests around the Western world.

In the next six weeks to late April, the UN’s body count had gone up by another 5,000.

Of course I agree that this is appalling. But stopping people getting killed is not just a matter of being very upset about it.

Pressure is only a good thing if it is pushing in the right direction. What the international community did was to give the Sri Lankan forces every reason to think that the West was about to try to stop them ending a generation long conflict. I simply donsee how intensifying this effort could possibly have encouraged them to adopt a more careful approach. Logically, it could only have made them think that they had better hurry up and find Prabhakaran before he could be offered yet another chance to escape.

If we have to relive those miserable days, let us at least come up with some genuinely useful insights.

http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/12617

Ethnic rights in Sri Lanka

By Anuradha Mitra Chenoy

23rd November 2012 12:00 AM

As a post-conflict society Sri Lanka has to engage in peace building and state reconstruction after years of war with the Tamil minority, who are now represented by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). For years the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in a civil war for Tamil rights creating parallel structures to those of the state and supporting the cause of secession. In doing this, the LTTE also held its own people hostage, assassinating even those within the community who wanted to opt for peaceful means of struggle through non-violent and political ways. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that has emerged as one of the main parties representing the Tamil people after the 30 year war ended, is an organisation that suffered on account of both the obduracy of the Sri Lankan state as well as the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government should recognise this changed reality.

However, what has happened since the end of the war? The Sri Lankan government appointed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) that met thousands of victims and came out with a report. The TNA rejected this report’s findings and recommendations because this report did not hold the government accountable and did not give justice or even a full account of the war crimes that the international community, Press and United Nations’ agencies showed had occurred. At the same time, while the LLRC has strong shortcomings, it makes some recommendations that can initiate a process with which the Tamil leaders can start work, and then move ahead negotiating their demands systematically.

The Sri Lankan government held elections after the war, including in the north and east areas that were earlier not under Colombo’s control, to show that a period of normalcy had been initiated. In this election the TNA won significantly. Their main demand is the creation of a type of federal Sri Lanka where the Tamils can have autonomy. They want a merger of the north and east areas where Tamils live. They talk of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was backed by India years back that will make a kind of federal arrangement possible. The Sri Lankan government, however, does not appear to consider any of their demands seriously.

The Tamils also want that the hundred thousand Tamils displaced by the war should be returned to their homes and rehabilitated with their livelihood and dignity. This process has been painfully slow and has only added to the grief of the minority community. Women have been very seriously affected by the conflict. Gendered crimes were rampant. They were symbols of Tamil honour and thus abused. Many participated in the war as suicide bombers and guerilla outfits and became victims and martyrs. They bore the burden of looking after their families and community. They need special attention.

Things are far from normal in Sri Lanka. This stems first from the triumphalism, majoritarianism, militarisation and stereotyping in the mindset of the Sri Lankan regime in power as well as in all structures and institutions. President Mahinda Rajapakse’s regime is not willing to address the root cause of the Tamil minority problem. They frequently refer to the TNA as holding on to the LTTE positions. This is untrue. The Tamils have given up the demand for a separate state and will settle for a federal arrangement.

At the same time, the TNA and other Tamils must also recognise the Tamil Muslims, who were forced to migrate out of Tamil areas by the LTTE during their hold on the area. They must not accede to the pressure of the Tamil diaspora and their long distance and surrogate extra nationalism. If the TNA wants a plural, secular and federal Sri Lanka they also must in turn recognise minority rights and make adequate social, political and economic space for their own minorities and dissenters.

Interestingly, President Rajapaksa has appealed to the influential forces in India that can sway Tamil opinion, including the Indian media. He knows India can play a major role. At the same time, in Tamil Nadu, emotions remain high and sensitive on the Tamil ethnic cause in Sri Lanka. All political parties and Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa have been repeatedly asking the Indian government to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government. Recently Jayalalithaa wrote a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh objecting to India training Sri Lankan Army personnel. She continuously takes up this cause as it is a major political issue.

India in its turn is walking on a razor’s edge. On the one hand they need to make sure the Tamil sentiment is not hurt. They would like to see a Sri Lanka that can only be stable if it accepts a multi-ethnic, federal structure but also respects minority and human rights. On the other hand India cannot intervene in local politics beyond a point because it can be considered as hegemonic and the Sri Lankan regime will turn to China and could even give them a military base. At the same time China can never replace India in Sri Lankan geopolitics.

So in these circumstances India has to tread carefully where its priority should be to keep putting sustained yet subtle pressure that Sri Lanka deliver on the issue of ethnic rights. It also has to indicate to the Sri Lankan Tamil parties, like the TNA, that they too must ensure the rights of all communities. The only way for a just solution to Sri Lanka would be a step-by-step federal, right-based restructuring within a time frame acceptable by all parties. This would include de-militarisation and ensuring women’s rights, rehabilitation and participation. Liberals and ethnic minorities of Sri Lanka believe India has a positive role in this. India should try and fulfil this.

Anuradha Mitra Chenoy is professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/article1350564.ece

Celebrating flavours from Sri Lanka

By Saadia S Dhailey, TNN | Nov 21, 2012, 05.42 PM IST

Chefs from Sri Lanka in the city to create the most authentic Sri Lankan meal for Mumbaikars

In an attempt to promote cross country culture and cuisine, Sahara Star hosts 'Sri Lankan Food Festival' that started on November 15 at Earthplate. Three renowned chefs from Hotel Heritance, Ahungalla, Sri Lanka are down for the the food festival that will be on till December 5, 2012 to create the most authentic Sri Lankan cuisine for the patrons.

Sri Lankan cuisine is one of the most complex cuisines of South Asia. Due to its proximity to South India, the cuisine of Sri Lanka shows some influence, yet it's quite distinct and has a flavour of its own. Rice which forms the staple diet is served with variety of curries. Considering the fact that one of Sri Lanka's major agricultural products is pepper, it isn't surprising that most local cuisine is very fiery.

In addition to the regular buffet, there will be a separate buffet spread comprising traditional Srilankan cuisine like Isso Vayanjanaya (prawn curry), Kukul Mas Rathuwata (chicken red curry), Elumas Vinakiri Stew (mutton stew), Rabu Hindala (raddish dry curry), Bathala Theldala (sweet potato tempered), Biththra Roti (egg roti), Bibikkan (coconut & dry fruit cake), Wataappan (juggery pudding), Polkiri Caramel (coconut cream caramel) and so on. The visiting chef will be interacting with guests and giving them a brief orientation on the cuisine.

Hotel Sahara Star aims at offering guests not just unique dining experience but an amalgamation of varied cuisine. Taking this vision of promoting cuisines across countries, the hotel now presents the Sri Lankan food festival in order to give a global experience to its guests. Chefs from Sahara Star- Master Chef Vishal Kunwar Singh, a connoisseur of Indian food assisted by Chef Rohit Kene and Chef Dhanpal Singh Negi have just returned from Sri Lanka after hosting an Indian food festival overseas.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/food/food-festivals/Celebrating-flavours-from-Sri-Lanka/articleshow/17309239.cms
 

Power concentration in Sri Lanka threatens economic possibilities

Updated Tuesday, November 20, 2012 2:27 pm TWN, By Frank Jack Daniel, Reuters

JAFFNA, Sri Lanka -- From foreign hotel towers sprouting on Colombo's seafront to the new motorcycles and mobile phones buzzing in war-ravaged Jaffna, at first glance, Sri Lanka seems to be living up to its claim as Asia's latest frontier market.

But private businesses are not investing enough, threatening the boom that has swept the island since the end of a long ethnic conflict, while President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his family are tightening their grip on the economy and institutions with what critics see as an unusually personalized system of government.

The global economy may be in poor shape, but with 17 percent growth since the war ended in 2009 and an eye-popping 200-percent rise in the stock market, investors should be flocking to Sri Lanka's palm-fringed shores.

Instead, even home-grown businesses are shy.

The government reported US$1 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI) last year, a record, but even officials accept that is not enough. More worrying, because it raises questions about the reliability of official data, the United Nations put FDI at just US$300 million last year, its lowest level since 2005.

There are several possible explanations, but critics say that by making Sri Lanka something of a personal fiefdom and dragging his feet on reconciliation between the ethnic minority Tamil-dominated north and the majority Sinhalese Buddhist population, Rajapaksa shoulders some of the blame.

The president and his brothers control ministries and departments accounting for about 70 percent of the budget, including finance and defense. His elder son is an elected legislator and his eldest brother is the speaker of parliament, where the president holds a more-than two-thirds majority.

“A handful of people seems to have captured both political authority and the economy,” said Harsha de Silva, spokesman on economic affairs for the main opposition United National Party.

“Almost four years after the end of the war, we are yet to see any established investors setting up businesses, apart for some big hotel chains.”

One Rajapaksa brother, Economic Affairs Minister Basil Rajapaksa, justified the system, telling Reuters that politics was a family affair everywhere from the United States to India and pointing out that he and his relatives were elected parliamentarians.

“It is a dynasty, but by people's choice, a people's dynasty,” he said in an interview, and suggested that more, rather than less, concentration of decision-making would help investment in a country where multiple permits slow startups.

“In other countries who are successful, they were successful because immediately one person he takes the decisions. In Sri Lanka, the main problem is that that is not there, more decisions have to be centralized.”

Opponents say the extensive control of commerce by the president and his family is at the root of the country's problems.

“Half of all the ministries which are engaged in businesses are controlled by Rajapaksa family under his ruling. That is the main problem we are facing today,” said Sunil Handunnetti, an opposition parliamentarian with the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, which used to support the president.

Indians and Chinese

Whatever the rights or wrongs of the argument, the investment shortfall is a problem for President Rajapaksa, whose goal of 8 percent annual economic growth largely rests on foreign inflows in the form of debt from multilateral lenders and friends like China.

Economists say this is not sustainable in the long run.

The president's model of rapid infrastructure development has helped Sri Lanka bounce back more successfully than most post-war countries, but economists and businesses are wary.

With Sri Lanka tipped as the top destination of 2013 by the Lonely Planet travel publisher and visitors up 30 percent last year, global hotel brands are lining up. But few are investing heavily, preferring to tie up with local players, some of which have links with the government.

Central bank Governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal said negative reports about human rights violations during and after the war had a chilling affect on foreign direct investment, particularly from the West. The United Nations has urged the government to investigate reports of serious abuses during the war.

“Asian investors understand Asia better, as far as the ground situation is concerned, so you can see, the Indian investors are here, the Chinese investors are here,” he said.

But de Silva said old problems worried people looking to do business.

“Investors will come only when they see stability. The stability will come with genuine peace. There is no cohesiveness. There is no position of the government for the devolution of power,” de Silva said.

The Pathfinder Foundation economic think tank warns that Sri Lanka is showing signs of “opportunistic state capitalism,” with the government cherry-picking opportunities and creating confusion about the roles of the private and public sectors.

Luxman Siriwardena, Pathfinder's executive director, says Sri Lanka's investment rate of 30 percent of gross domestic product leaves a shortfall of about US$3 billion needed to attain the government's target of 8 percent growth.

“There is also need for greater clarity regarding the respective roles of the private and state sectors, including the military, in economic activity,” he said.

'Not confident'

Jaffna, in the north where Tamils dominate, was once the second city and a major industrial hub. It is just emerging from isolation as an epicenter of the war that began in 1983. Up to 40,000 civilians may have been killed in the government's remorseless final offensive, according to the United Nations.

Public works and an appetite for consumer goods fuelled by remittances from exiles have spurred growth in a town of bombed out buildings, but businesses are gloomy about the future.

The seaside city was virtually cut off from the rest of the country during the war that pitted largely Hindu Tamils against mostly Buddhist Sinhalese. It could take months for people in the area to get permission from the army to travel south.

Now, buses run daily and two domestic airlines fly there with small prop aircraft.

The most successful is Helitours, which flies passengers for half the price of its rival, Expo Air. Helitours is able to do so because it is part of the air force and has lower overheads.

Helitours also flies tourists to a golf course at an armed forces resort in another former war zone in the east — part of a network of military businesses that extends from private security and farming to catering and whale-watching.

Some Jaffna residents complain the military controls too much land seized in the war. Others warn that government foot-dragging on local elections and easing ethnic tension has deterred both locals and wealthy overseas Tamils from investing.

Young Tamil businessman V. Kandappa came back from Britain at the end of the war to set up a business in his parent's bomb-damaged home — a rare returned exile. He builds homes for members of the diaspora who dream of coming back. Almost half the population left Jaffna during the war.

“The private sector is still not confident about what is going to happen on the ethnic front, people are scared to invest their money in the north and eastern provinces,” Kandappa said.

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/reuters/2012/11/20/361503/p2/Power-concentration.htm